Object memories activated by borders serve as priors for figure assignment: figures are more likely to be perceived on the side of a border where a well-known object is sketched. Do object memories also affect the appearance of object borders? Memories represent past experience with objects; memories of well-known objects include many with sharp borders because they are often fixated. We investigated whether object memories affect appearance by testing whether blurry borders appear sharper when they are contours of well-known objects versus matched novel objects. Participants viewed blurry versions of one familiar and one novel stimulus simultaneously for 180ms; then made comparative (Exp. 1) or equality judgments regarding perceived blur (Exps. 2-4). For equivalent levels of blur, the borders of well-known objects appeared sharper than those of novel objects. These results extend evidence for the influence of past experience to object appearance, consistent with dynamic interactive models of perception.
Studies of vision demonstrate that bottom-up processes are insufficient for understanding 1 how the brain constructs our percept of the external world; instead, higher factors such as 2 attention, expectation, and memory influence visual processing [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . While attention facilitates 3 processing of visual stimuli by granting priority to the more relevant aspects of the scene, 4 memory and expectation constrain possible interpretations of visual input and predict what is 5 likely to occur in the sensory environment; all result in improved perceptual performance 3,6-8 . 6
In addition to behavioural effects, Carrasco and colleagues showed that spatial attention 7 can increase the subjective appearance of contrast 9 . Their participants viewed two Gabor patches 8
shown to the left and right of fixation; their task was to report the orientation of the higher 9 contrast patch. Before the Gabor patches were shown, participants were cued to allocate attention 10 to either the left or right location. They found that the stimulus in the location to which attention 11 was allocated appeared higher in contrast than the unattended stimulus. Additional experiments 12 extended the influence of attention on stimulus appearance to other attributes, such as spatial 13 resolution 10 , spatial frequency and gap size 11 , colour saturation 12 , and motion coherence 13 . 14 The results described above raise the question of whether other high-level factors, such as 15 expectation and prior experience, can modulate stimulus appearance, in particular the perceived 16 sharpness of blurry object borders [14] [15] . Like contrast and spatial frequency, blur is a fundamental 17 feature in vision. Blur is present in varying degrees due to changes in the environment (distance 18 or depth) or the observer (pupil diameter or refractive errors), yet the visual system compensates 19 for blur to allow us to see the world 'in focus' 16 . Blur detection thresholds have been shown to be 20 unaffected by manipulations of attention via cognitive load 17 , but a previous study suggests that 21 the appearance of blur is affected by past experience 15 : In order to match the apparent blur of a 22 real word, a comparison pseudo-word had to be sharper. The stimuli in that experiment were 23 displayed indefinitely; hence, observers could have adjusted their focus differently when looking 24 at real versus pseudo-words, in which case the results would indicate that prior experience alters 25 behaviour (which leads to a change in perceived blur) but would not indicate that prior 26 experience directly alters appearance. We report six experiments investigating whether the 27 integration of memory representations with sensory input can sharpen the appearance of blurry 28 borders of a well-known object versus a matched novel object when both objects were briefly 29 presented simultaneously, eliminating the possibility of differential accommodation for the two 30 types of stimuli. 31
A well-known object is one that has been encountered often in daily life (henceforth, 32 referred to as a familiar object). Therefore, memories of familiar objects probably span a range 33 of blur levels. Many of these memories are likely to be sharp given that people fixate on objects 34 with which they interact 18 . Thus, if percepts are generated by combining bottom-up input with 35 higher-level object memories activated by a stimulus, then for a given level of blur, the borders 36 of familiar objects should appear sharper than those of novel objects. We tested this hypothesis 37 and also examined whether predictions generated from a word prime can sharpen the perception 38 of the blurry borders of a well-known object. The presentation of a prime typically improves 39 performance, most likely because the word activates a target-related concept before the 40 stimulus [19] [20] [21] . We used a masked prime to attempt to manipulate expectations before the 41 silhouettes appeared. 42 Results 43
Experiment 1 -Comparative Judgements 44
In Experiment 1A we presented two objects, one familiar and one novel. The novel object was 45 matched to the familiar object by rearranging the parts of the familiar object into a novel 46 configuration (Fig. 1A) . The objects were blurred using a 2-D Gaussian smoothing filter. The 47 standard deviation (s) of the smoothing filter was manipulated from s = 3 -11, thereby 48 manipulating blur over a range of 9 standard deviations that we refer to as blur levels (Fig 2; see 49 Methods). In half the trials, the familiar object was the Standard, set at blur level of 7 and the 50 novel object was the Test, presented at blur levels ranging 3 (least blurry) to 11 (blurriest); in the 51 other half of the trials, these roles were reversed. Masked word primes preceded the stimulus 52 presentation. These primes denoted either the familiar object, an unrelated object, or had no 53 semantic value (a string of x's; Fig. 3 shows a sample trial sequence). Participants were 54 instructed to report whether the object on the left or on the right appeared blurrier. 55
As expected if object memories sharpen the appearance of blurry borders, the point at 56
which Test objects appear equal to Standard objects was shifted toward the blurrier end of the 57 continuum for familiar compared to novel Test objects, indicating that for a given level of blur, 58 the borders of the familiar object appear sharper than those of the novel object. Fig. 4A shows 59 the average proportion of trials on which participants reported the Test object was blurrier as a 60 function of the Test object blur level. A logistic function fit to the averages yielded the point of 61 subjective equality (PSE). Fig. 4B shows the PSE for each of the priming conditions and each 62 stimulus condition. In Experiment 1A a blurrier familiar Test object (PSE 7.59, SE = 0.091) was 63 subjectively equal to a Standard novel stimulus, and a sharper novel Test object (PSE 6.42, SE = 64 0.069) was subjectively equal to a Standard familiar stimulus. This difference was expected if 65 perception results from the integration of the current sensory information with long-term 66 memory (LTM) representations of objects that on average are sharper than the blurry versions of 67 familiar objects presented in the experiment. Averaging over the PSE differences found in the 68 two Test object conditions, the results show that the familiar object appeared sharper than the 69 matched novel object by 0.59 of a blur step in Experiment 1A. A 2 X 3 ANOVA (with the 70 factors of Test Object type: familiar vs. novel, and Prime type: identity, unrelated, and control), 71 showed a statistically significant main effect of Test object type, F1,13 = 70.9, p < .00001, ηp 2 = 72 0.85. There was no effect of Prime type, F2, 26 = 1.57, p = 0.23, ηp 2 = 0.11; nor was there an 73 interaction between Prime type and Test Object type, F2, 26 = 0.14, p = .87, ηp 2 = 0.010. 74
We hypothesized that the absence of a priming effect might occur because the masks 75 interfered with the effectiveness of the word prime. Accordingly, we changed the masking 76 conditions in Experiment 1B, such that the pre-and post-masks were shorter in duration, whereas 77 the prime was longer. To further reduce the interference of the pre-mask with the prime, on each 78 trial, we substituted a string of pound signs ("####") for the random string of consonants used in 79 Experiment 1A. 80 Fig. 4C shows the proportion of 'Blurrier' responses as a function of Test object blur 81 level for Experiment 1B. Replicating Experiment 1A, the curve-fitting data showed that blurrier 82 familiar Test objects appeared subjectively equal to Standard novel objects (PSE = blur of 7.41, 83 SE = 0.068) and sharper novel Test objects appeared equal to Standard familiar objects (PSE = 84 blur of 6.63, SE = 0.060; Fig 3D) . Thus, overall familiar objects appeared sharper by a blur step 85 = 0.39. An ANOVA showed a statistically significant main effect of Test Object type, F1,13 = 86 46.5, p < .00001, ηp 2 = 0.78. Again, we observed no main effect of Prime type, F2, 26 = 0.56, p = 87 0.58, ηp 2 = 0.041, and no significant interaction between Prime type and Test Object type, F2, 26 = 88 0.30, p = 0.75, ηp 2 = 0.022. 89
The lack of priming effects may be due to the low predictive relationship of the identity 90 prime to the stimuli: Both the familiar and the novel stimulus were shown on each trial; subjects 91 were unaware of which was the Test and which was the Standard. The prime conditions referred 92 only to the Test object; hence, the prime denoted the familiar Test stimulus on only 16.7% of 93 trials; 33.3% of the trials were unprimed (control) trials, and 50% of the trials were preceded by 94 a prime that was unrelated to the familiar object (see Methods). This low predictive relationship 95 probably reduced the likelihood of observing a priming effect. It is clear that even for familiar 96
Test objects, the primes had no effect. 97
In order to verify that we manipulated familiarity effectively, participants were asked to 98 identify the two objects that were presented during the experiment on a post-experiment 99 questionnaire. In Experiment 1A, 76% of participants named the familiar object as a lamp. The 100 most common interpretation for the novel object was 'ghost,' with 32% agreement. In 101 Experiment 1B, 66% of participants identified the familiar object. The most common 102 interpretation for the novel object was again 'ghost,' with 25% agreement. Thus, participants 103 were more likely to perceive one of the stimuli as denoting a familiar object than the other. 104
Experiment 2 -Equality Judgements 105
In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to report whether the two objects presented 106 on each trial were the same or different levels of blur. We recorded equality judgments to allay 107 the potential response bias criticism that participants may have simply chosen the novel object 108 when they were uncertain regarding which object was blurrier 22,23 . We averaged the proportion 109 of 'Same' responses for each Test blur level ( Fig. 5A ). We then fit these averages to a normal 110 Gaussian distribution to obtain a centroid value (b), which corresponds to the location of the 111 peak of the distribution (where the probability of a 'Same' response is highest). Fig. 5B shows 112 the centroid value for each Test Object type and each Prime type in Experiment 2. Replicating 113 the effect of Experiment 1, this time assessed by equality judgements rather than comparative 114 judgements, the familiar object was perceived as sharper than the novel object (bfamiliar = blur 115 level of 8.02, SE = 0.085; bnovel = blur level of 7.56, SE = 0.078). The ANOVA showed a 116 significant main effect of Test Object type, F1,22 = 34.1, p < .0001, ηp 2 = 0.61. These results 117 support the hypothesis that, for familiar objects, perceived sharpness is a joint function of the 118 current stimulus and LTM representations of familiar objects that are on average sharper than the 119
Standard stimulus in the current experiment. No such LTM representations exist for the novel 120 object. 121
We also observed a main effect of Prime type, F2,44 = 3.65, p < 0.05 ηp 2 = 0.14: The 122 centroid values for both familiar and novel Test objects were significantly higher when they were 123 preceded by an unrelated prime (b = blur level of 7.85, SE = 0.068) rather than an identity prime 124 (b = blur level of 7.74, SE = 0.078; p < .02). It is difficult to interpret this main effect because 125 neither "unrelated" nor "identity" primes had any relationship to the novel object; they were 126 dummy primes from the same categories as the primes for the familiar object -an artificial 127 object in the identity condition (i.e., "pole") and a natural object in the unrelated condition (i.e., 128 "hawk) -yet the effect was present. Moreover, the mean centroids in the "no prime" condition 129 did not differ significantly from those in the other two priming conditions, p > 0.28 for the 130 identity prime and p > 0.13 for the unrelated prime, so the results can't stem from a systematic 131 response to the prime category (e.g., systematically inhibiting expectations based on artificial 132 primes but not natural primes). Finally, Prime type and Test Object type did not interact, F2, 44 = 133 0.15, p = 0.87, ηp 2 = 0.007, as would be expected if the identity prime induced an expectation 134 that modulated the perceived blur of the familiar object but not the novel object. 135
To estimate the perceived increase in sharpness due to familiarity, we divided the 136 difference between the centroids for the familiar versus novel objects by two to account for the 137 fact that any difference observed assays the perceived sharpening of the familiar object both 138 when it was the Test and when it was the Standard, as in Experiments 1A and 1B. Using this 139 method, the familiarity-dependent sharpening step was estimated as 0.23 (SE = 0.040) of a blur 140 step, smaller than in Experiments 1A and 1B. We attribute this difference to evidence indicating 141 that equality judgments are harder than comparative judgments and responses are more 142 variable 24-26 . Nevertheless, the estimated sharpening step in Experiment 2 was statistically 143 greater than 0, t22 = 5.84, p < 0.00001, Cohen's d = 1.22. 144
In Experiment 2, the centroid for both the familiar and novel Test objects corresponded to 145 a blurrier object than the Standard. This centroid shift may result from the asymmetric 146 application of two criteria for 'Different' -"different because sharper" and "different because 147 blurrier." As Fig. 5A clearly shows, there are more 'Same' responses when the blur of the Test 148 object is greater than that of the Standard object. This asymmetry likely arises from a known 149 nonlinearity in responses to blur wherein increments in blur level are harder to discriminate for 150 increasingly blurry stimuli 27,28 . Asymmetric use of two criteria in equality judgments is not 151 uncommon 24 . Note, however, that responses were affected by this asymmetry when both novel 152 and familiar objects were the Test object. Therefore, the asymmetric use of 'Different' criteria 153 cannot account for the results showing that for a given level of blur, familiar objects are 154 perceived as sharper than novel objects. 155
Most participants in Experiment 2 identified the familiar object as a lamp with 59% 156 agreement. The most common interpretation for the novel object was again 'ghost,' with 21% 157 agreement. Thus, participants were more likely to perceive one of the stimuli as denoting a well-158 known "familiar" object than the other. 159
Experiment 3 -Equality Judgements without Priming 160
In Experiment 3, participants again reported whether the two objects presented on each 161 trial were the same or different levels or blur. Because of the absence of systematic effects of 162 priming in the previous experiments, the stimuli were not preceded by primes or pre-and post-163
masks. 164
The distribution of 'Same' responses is shown in Fig. 6A . Once again, the centroid value 165 was significantly higher for the familiar object (b = blur level of 7.93, SE = 0.11) than for the 166 novel object (b = blur level of 7.43, SE = 0.083; Fig. 6B ), indicating that the familiar object was 167 perceived as sharper than the novel object at an equivalent level of blur, t24 = 5.69, p < 0.00001, 168 SE = 0.087, Cohen's d = 1.138, replicating the results of Experiment 2 without word primes 169 before the displays. As in Experiment 2, the centroids for both Test Object types were greater 170 than the value of the Standard, indicating the asymmetric application of a 'Different' criterion 171
for Test objects blurrier versus sharper than the Standard. Critically, this occurred when both 172 familiar and novel objects were the Test objects and did not prevent the observation of a 173 difference in the centroids for familiar versus novel Test objects. 174
The responses collected in the post-experiment questionnaire revealed that most 175 participants identified the familiar object, with 70% reporting it was a lamp. The most common 176 interpretations for the novel object were 'Vase' and 'Octopus', with 13% agreement each. Thus, 177 participants were substantially more likely to perceive one of the stimuli as denoting a well-178 known "familiar" object than the other. 179
Experiment 4 -Equality Judgements with Different Stimuli 180
In Experiment 4, to examine whether this effect generalizes beyond the stimuli used in 181 Test objects were perceived as equal to those of the Standard novel object. The centroid value 187 was statistically higher for the familiar object than for the novel object ( reported perceiving the two objects as equal in blur when the familiar Test object was at a higher 191 blur level than the novel Standard object. The estimated familiarity-dependent sharpening step 192 was 0.40 (SE = 0.056) of a blur level. As in Experiments 2-3, the centroid values for both the 193 novel and the familiar Test objects were higher than that of the Standard (blur level = 7), 194 consistent with an asymmetric application of a 'Different' criterion, that we attribute to the 195 nonlinear response to blur 27-28 affecting the criterion for both types of Test objects. In 196 Experiment 4A, 90% of participants identified the familiar object as an anchor correctly. Only 197 one interpretation of the novel object was mentioned by more than one participant: "Yoda" (a 198 "Star Wars" film character), with 15% agreement. Thus, participants were substantially more 199 likely to perceive one of the stimuli as denoting a familiar object than the other. 200
In Experiment 4B, we did not obtain the previously-seen shift in perceived blur between 201 the familiar and novel conditions (Fig. 7C ). The centroid values obtained for the familiar and the 202 novel objects ( Fig. 7D ; bfamiliar = blur level of 7.70, SE = 0.095; bnovel = blur level of 7.76, SE = 203 0.085) did not differ statistically, t15 = -0.83, p = 0.42, Cohen's d = 0.21 The responses to the 204 post-experiment questionnaire for Experiment 4B reveal the reason: while 80% of participants 205 were able to correctly name the familiar object as a woman, there was high agreement that the 206 putatively novel object depicted a familiar object: 45% agreed that the novel object resembled a 207 lamp, and 20% agreed it represented a male figure, producing a combined index of 65% familiar 208 object interpretations for the novel stimulus. Thus, Experiment 4B was not a good test of our 209 hypothesis, although it did establish that differences between conditions are not necessarily 210 obtained using this method; differences in perceived familiarity are essential. In Experiment 4B 211 as in Experiments 2-4A, the centroid values for both familiar and novel objects were greater than 212 the Standard value of 7, supporting the hypothesis that the asymmetric application of the 213 criterion for 'Different' was a consequence of participants' differential ability to perceive 214 differences in blur across the blur continuum rather than differences in familiarity. 215
Discussion 216
In Experiment 1 participants made comparative judgements, indicating which of two 217 simultaneously displayed blurry objects was 'Blurrier'; PSEs indicated that for equivalent levels 218 of blur, a familiar object appeared sharper than a novel object, both when it was the Standard 219 and when it was the Test object. These results were consistent with the hypothesis that object 220 perception in general and object appearance in particular result from the integration of memory 221 representations with the input. For well-known objects, these include many instances in which 222 the objects were fixated and attended outside the laboratory 18 , thus these representations are 223 sharper than the blurry images used in these experiments. The (sharper) activated memory 224 representations of the known object are integrated with the (blurry) sensory input, and this will 225 produce a percept that is sharper than the displayed object. Note that we conceive of object 226 memories as dynamic representations that are updated with each exposure to an object. 227
Nonetheless, experience with novel objects accrued during the experiment cannot produce 228 equivalent results because only blurry versions of the objects were shown. Indeed, we found no 229 evidence that experience with blurry versions of the familiar object during the experiment caused 230 it to appear less sharp in the second half of trials. 231
Might a response bias interpretation fit our results? Suppose, for instance, that there was a 232 bias to pair "novel" with "blurry;" could it be argued that the results of Experiments 1A and B 233 index response bias rather than appearance? (Note that no such bias is known.) In order to 234 eliminate potential response bias effects, participants in Experiments 2-4 made equality 235 judgements. Anton-Erxleben et al 24 had replicated previously observed 9 effects of attention on 236 perceived contrast in experiments measuring equality judgments rather than comparative 237 judgments, thereby ruling out a response bias interpretation for those results 25 . Similarly, our 238 experiments measuring equality judgments replicated the results we obtained with comparative 239 judgments showing that blurry familiar objects appeared sharper than equivalently blurry 240 matched novel objects. Experiment 4B did not show the same pattern of results, but responses to 241 a post-experiment questionnaire revealed that both the familiar and the putatively novel object 242 were perceived as depicting familiar objects. Thus, using the same procedure with two seemingly 243 familiar objects, the difference in perceived sharpness disappeared, confirming that the effects 244 obtained in the previous experiments are indeed mediated by activation of familiar objects 245 memories, and not by a procedural artefact. 246
In Experiments 2-4 the centroid value for the novel stimulus deviated from the Standard 247 in the same direction, albeit to a lesser degree, as that for the familiar stimulus. This pattern was 248 attributed to the asymmetric use of the two criteria for 'Different' responses operative in equality 249 judgments, which resulted in a more liberal use of 'Same' responses for Test objects with larger 250 blur levels than the Standard. It is known that sensitivity to differences in blur decreases with 251 increasing blur levels 27,28 . Perhaps the 'different because blurrier' criterion was affected when 252 discrimination was harder. This change in criterion operated equally for familiar and novel Test 253 objects, however. Accordingly, the difference between the centroids for the familiar and novel 254 objects can still estimate familiarity-dependent differences in perceived sharpness of object 255 borders. Like Experiment 1, Experiments 2, 3 and 4A showed that blurry familiar objects appear 256 significantly sharper than blurry novel objects. 257
In Experiments 2-4A, the sharpening step was approximately 1/3 of a blur step; this small 258 effect is likely due to the decreased sensitivity of equality judgements relative to comparative 259 judgements 24-26 . In Experiments 1A and 1B where comparative judgements were used, the 260 average sharpening step was 1/2 a blur step, which is approximately half of the just noticeable 261 difference (JND; approximately one blur level in Experiments 1A and 1B). Despite a reduction 262 in the measured size of the sharpening step in Experiments 1-4A, it remained significantly 263 greater than zero, demonstrating that for a given level of blur, familiar objects appear sharper 264 than novel objects. The magnitude of past experience influences measured in any given 265 experiment likely depends on a variety of factors, including experimental procedure as 266 demonstrated here. Accordingly, we argue that what is critically important is the evidence that 267 familiar objects appear sharper than novel objects, not the degree of sharpening observed in any 268 single experiment. Our results demonstrate that the brain does not produce an exact replica of our 269 surroundings. Instead, via the integration of memory representations from previous experiences, 270 it finds the best interpretation for the often ambiguous input it receives, and this alters object 271 appearance. Here, we have demonstrated that, when objects have blurry borders, well-known 272 ("familiar") objects appear sharper than novel objects. Future experiments should explore 273 whether other visual properties, such as contrast and spatial frequency are also influenced by 274 prior experience. 275
Might our results be explained by attention rather than by the integration of incoming 276 information with memories of familiar objects? Some have claimed that attention is 277 automatically allocated to familiar over novel objects 29 . Yet a recent study 30 showed that 278 previous results taken to support this claim were replicated only under conditions of search 279 involving spatiotemporal uncertainty 31, 32 . Our experiments did not involve search nor was 280 spatiotemporal uncertainty present: each stimulus was shown in one of only two locations at a 281 fixed interval after trial onset; hence it is unlikely that attention was allocated toward the familiar 282 object. Is it possible that when participants found the blur comparison difficult, their uncertainty 283 was high such that familiarity was prioritized for attentional allocation, thereby causing the 284 perceived sharpening of the borders of the familiar objects? Given that the only uncertainty in 285 the equality experiment was whether the two objects were the same or different blur levels, we 286 find this explanation unlikely. Finally, there is some evidence that novel objects are more likely 287 than familiar objects to attract attention 33-35 . 288 Could claims that attention is attracted by blur explain our results? Both novel and 289 familiar stimuli were presented an equal number of times in all blur levels; hence this 290 explanation cannot account for our data. Moreover, blur detection has been shown to occur pre-291 attentively 17 . Object memories have also been shown to operate pre-attentively to influence 292 figure assignment [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] . Consequently, the explanation in terms of the integration of object 293 memory and current stimulation better fits the data than an explanation in terms of attention. 294
Previous studies have shown that borders of stimuli such as those tested here can access memory 295 representations of familiar objects very early in processing and serve as priors for figural 296 assignment 4,5,36,38-42 . The present experiments show that the influence of past experiences 297 transcends the effect seen on figural assignment and extends to the subjective appearance of 298
stimuli. 299
Higher-level influences on the perception of stimuli have also been observed in studies 300 on perceived sharpness of objects in peripheral vision 43-45, cf. 46,47 . Objects in the periphery tend to 301 appear sharper than an equally-blurry object presented foveally. This "sharpness overconstancy" 302 is thought to arise from a default assumption of sharpness caused by a prevalence of sharp 303 borders in the visual world. Our results may relate to sharpness overconstancy because our 304 stimuli were presented in the near retinal periphery. However, sharpness overconstancy cannot 305 account for the differential sharpening of the familiar relative to the novel objects because both 306 were equidistant from fixation; participants were comparing two peripheral stimuli to each other. 307
Thus, our results add to the literature by showing that this phenomenon varies as a function of 308 the familiarity of the object. 309
The effects seen in this study may be mediated by feedback from high-level brain regions 310 representing object memories. Recently, the perirhinal cortex (PRC) of the medial temporal lobe 311 (MTL), traditionally considered exclusively a memory-related structure, has been implicated in 312 object perception 48-54 . Barense and colleagues found that the PRC plays a critical role in border 313 familiarity effects on figure assignment 52 and proposed that the PRC modulates activity in the 314 lower level visual area V2. Subsequent studies reported evidence consistent with this proposal 53-315 54 ; this evidence is consistent with the idea that memory representations of objects are integrated 316 with the input, as we hypothesize here (although we note that there is no evidence that feedback 317 from the PRC in particular mediates the present results). 318
These results showing that memory and perception interact to affect perceived blur 319 should be of interest to a broad range of scientists who seek to understand the brain (e.g., 320
neuroscientists, computational modelers, psychologists), to computer vision scientists, to 321 designers of autonomous vehicles that must operate in less than ideal conditions, and to those 322 who design visual displays. Elucidating the contributions of higher-order regions of the brain to 323 visual perception brings us closer to understanding the intricate processes that give rise to the 324 perceptions that guide our behaviour and allow us to interact with our environment. 325
Methods

326
The methods used in these experiments were carried out in accordance with guidelines 327 established by, and the explicit approval of, the Human Subjects Protection Program at the 328 University of Arizona. The experiments were conducted on a Dell OptiPlex 9020 computer and 329 displayed on a 24-in. AOC monitor at 1920 x 1080 resolution and a 100Hz refresh rate. 330
Participants used a standard keyboard to navigate from trial to trial. In Experiments 1 and 2, the 331 keyboard was used to make responses. In Experiments 3-5, participants used a separate number 332 pad to make responses. The experiment was programmed using MATLAB (The Mathworks, 333 Natick, MA) R2015a and the Psychophysics Toolbox-3.0.12 [55] [56] . 334
The stimuli were black silhouettes (luminance 0.1 ftL) of familiar and novel objects, 335 presented on a medium grey background (luminance 31.7 ftL). In Experiments 1-3, the familiar 336 stimulus depicted a table lamp (Fig. 1A) ; in Experiments 4A and 4B the familiar stimuli depicted 337 an anchor (Fig. 1B) and a standing woman (Fig. 1C) . To control for differences in low-level 338 features, the novel stimulus was constructed by spatially rearranging the parts of the familiar 339 stimulus, with parts defined as lying between two successive minima of curvature cf. 57-58 . The 340 number of black pixels in the paired familiar and novel stimuli was equal. 341
In each of 864 trials, a familiar and a novel stimulus were shown to the right and left of 342 fixation. Before each trial, each stimulus was blurred to its assigned blur level using MATLAB's We examined whether we manipulated familiarity effectively with a post-experiment 363 questionnaire where participants were asked to name the two objects that were displayed during 364 the experiment. The answers to this question are summarized in the Results sections. 365
Additionally, while this experiment was underway an online Amazon Turk experiment was 366 conducted to determine the familiarity and novelty of a larger set of stimuli 59 . Thirty-two 367 participants viewed half portions of each stimulus (see Fig. 8 ), and listed the familiar objects 368 resembled by each stimulus. For the stimuli used in our experiments the results obtained in the 369 online experiment corroborate the results we obtained from the participants in our experiments. 370
In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2, the stimuli were preceded by one of three types of primes: 371
(1) identity primes, intended to induce an expectation for the named stimulus, (2) unrelated 372 primes (matched for word frequency to the identity primes 60 ), intended to induce an expectation 373 for an unrelated object from a different superordinate category, and (3) control primes, where no 374 word was presented prior to stimulus presentation. All primes were matched in word length. For 375 those on which the familiar object was the Test, the identity prime was "lamp", the unrelated 376 prime was "hawk", and the control prime was "xxxx." For trials on which the novel object was 377 the Test, the primes could not be classified as related or unrelated. Accordingly, we chose 378 "dummy" primes from the same categories as the primes for the familiar object. For the novel 379 objects, the dummy primes for the identity, unrelated, and control conditions were: "pole", 380 "chin", and "xxxx." All Prime types were presented equally often. The prime words "lamp" and 381 "pole" subtended 0.87 o X 2.44 o , "hawk" subtended 0. Word primes were both pre-and post-masked to render them unconscious. In Experiment 385 1A, the pre-mask and post-mask were unique strings of random consonants. In Experiments 1B 386 and 2, the pre-mask was changed to a string of #'s. The masks were the same length as the prime 387 words. 388
Experiments 1A and 1B -Comparative Judgements 389
Before beginning the experiment, participants viewed the instructions on the computer 390 screen while the experimenter read them aloud. The instructions explained that they would see 391 two objects on each trial, one to the left and one to the right of a fixation cross. Their task was to 392 report which object was blurrier. They were shown examples of the two stimuli and instructed to 393 make their responses with a button press using the left and right arrow keys. They were told they 394 would see the same two objects throughout the experiment. Next, they were guided through a 395 typical trial sequence (Fig. 2) . They then completed 3 blocks of 10 practice trials each. Prime 396 type and blur level of the Test objects (3 -11) were balanced in these practice trials. Each 397 stimulus appeared as Standard and as Test and on each side of the screen an equal number of 398 times. Each block of practice trials was presented in a random order so that each participant 399 completed a different sequence of practice trials. Three practice blocks accustomed participants 400 to viewing short exposure durations: the post-mask for the prime and the experimental stimuli 401 were shown for increasingly shorter exposure durations across the three blocks (twice as long in 402 the first practice block as on experimental trials, 1.5X as long in the second practice block, and 403 1.0X as long in the third practice block). 404
Participants completed 864 experimental trials. They were instructed to fixate on a cross 405 in the centre of the screen throughout the entire trial. They initiated each trial by pressing the 406 space bar. In Experiment 1A, a pre-mask appeared for 350 ms, followed by the prime (40 ms), 407 followed by the post mask (80 ms). In Experiment 1B the pre-mask was a string of #'s instead of 408 a random consonant sequence, the word prime was lengthened to 50 ms, and the post-mask was 409 shortened to 70 ms. After the post mask, the stimuli were displayed for 180 ms, a duration too 410 short for a saccade to one side or the other. The familiar and novel stimuli occurred equally often 411 on the left and the right of fixation. In each trial, one of the stimuli was the Standard (blur level = 412 7); the other, Test, stimulus was presented at blur levels ranging from 3 -11 equally often. The 413 familiar stimulus was the Test on half the trials; the novel stimulus was the Test on the other half 414 the trials. There were 16 trials for each combination of stimulus condition (familiar vs novel Test 415 stimulus), priming condition (identity, unrelated, control), and Test stimulus blur level (3-11). 416
All trial types were randomly intermixed. 417
After the stimuli disappeared, participants had up to 3 seconds to report whether the 418 object on the right or on the left was 'Blurrier.' Participants were instructed to report which 419 object was blurrier, as opposed to which was sharper in order to reduce the possibility that any 420 bias to pair the familiar object with the instructed response would favour our hypothesis 22 . 421 Participants responded using their right hand on the left and right arrow keys, where they pressed 422 the left arrow key for a left response, and the right arrow key for a right response. 423
Statistical Analysis. 424
Trials on which a response was not recorded during the 3s response window were 425 excluded. Trials with incorrect display timing were also removed (<1% of trials). This was 426 determined by a MATLAB script written to verify the display timing for each frame in the 427 experiment. For each participant, the data were separated by Prime type (identity, unrelated, 428 control) and Test Object type (familiar, novel). For each of these conditions, the number of times 429
the Test object was chosen as 'Blurrier' was averaged for each blur level. These averages served 430 as input for the curve-fitting toolbox in MATLAB. Using a Non-Linear Least Squares method, 431 the distribution of each participant's responses was fit to a Logistic Function, 432
where λ is the lapse rate, γ is the guess rate, α is the threshold parameter, and β is the slope 435 parameter. The threshold value corresponds to the location of the logistic curve where 436 participants are at chance level reporting either side as the blurrier option, indicating the point of 437 subjective equality (PSE). We obtained the threshold parameter value for each participant's 438 distribution, along with a confidence interval for this value. An outlier removal procedure 439 consisted of removing any participant whose confidence interval for the threshold parameter was 440 lower or higher than two standard deviations from the mean confidence interval for all 441 participants. Three rounds of this procedure were performed. The PSE values were submitted to 442 a 2 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA with Test Object type (familiar, novel) and Prime type 443 (identity, unrelated, control) as factors. 444
Experiments 2-4 Equality Judgements 445
Participants were instructed to report whether the two objects shown on each trial were 446 the same or different levels of blur. They recorded their responses using a separate number pad 447 rotated 90 o to the right, with keys on only the numbers 1 (at the top) and 3 (at the bottom). 448
Participants were instructed to press the top key if the two stimuli were equal in blur or the 449 bottom key if they were different. In other respects, the Experiment 2 procedure was the same as 450 that of Experiment 1B. The procedure for Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2, except 451 that no word primes were presented at any point during the experiment. Experiments 4A and 4B 452 were run interleaved in that when participants entered the laboratory, they were assigned to one 453 of the two experiments using an ABBA procedure. Participants took part in one experiment only. 454
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 3, with the exception of the stimuli. In Experiment 455 4A the familiar stimulus was the silhouette of an anchor and in Experiment 4B the familiar 456 stimulus was the silhouette of a woman. 457
Statistical Analysis 458
For each participant, the data were separated by Prime type (identity, unrelated, control) 459
and Test Object type (familiar novel), in a manner similar to Experiments 1A and 1B. The where a is the amplitude, b is the centroid value, c is related to the width of the peak, and n is the 464 number of peaks to fit (in this case, one peak). The centroid value, b, corresponds to the location 465 of the peak, where the probability of a 'Same' response is highest. A two-way repeated measures 466 ANOVA was performed on the results of Experiment 2 to assess the effect of Prime type and 467
Test Object type on the centroid value. A paired-sample, two-tailed t-test was used to compare 468 the centroid values for the familiar and novel Test Object types in Experiments 3 and 4. 469
Participants 470
All participants were University of Arizona (UA) undergraduate students (ages 17-23) 471 who participated to fulfil a class requirement. Participants and/or their legal guardian gave 472 informed consent on a form approved by the UA Human Subjects Protection Program. 473
Participants who were 18 years of age or older completed this form before taking part in the 474 experiments. Participants who were 17 years old were given the option to participate in order to 475 fulfill their class requirement and to have a consent form mailed to their legal guardian. Their 476 data were analysed only after we received a signed consent form in the mail. Participants had 477 normal or corrected to normal vision (at least 20/30) assessed by responses to a Snellen Eye 478 Chart Test. Before beginning data collection, two discard criteria were established for all 479 experiments in this article: Criterion 1 was "failure to follow task instructions" and criterion 2 480 was "pressing the wrong button in 30% of trials or more" as reported in the post-experiment 481 questionnaire. 482 Experiment 1A: The data of 14 participants (7 male, 7 female) are reported. Two other 483 participants were discarded based on criterion 1; eight others were excluded after the outlier 484 removal procedure. Experiment 1B: The data of 14 participants (5 male, 9 female) are reported. 485
Two other participants were discarded based on discard criterion 1; eight others were excluded 486 after the outlier removal procedure. Experiment 2: The data of 23 participants (11 male, 12 487 female) are reported. Six other participants were excluded after the outlier removal procedure; 488 none were discarded based on discard criteria. Experiment 3: The data of 25 participants (12 489 male, 13 female) are reported. Two other participants were discarded based on discard criterion 490 1; four were discarded based on criterion 2; and five others were excluded after the outlier 491 removal procedure. Experiment 4A: The data of 17 participants (10 male, 7 female) are reported. 492 Four other participants were discarded based on discard criterion 1; three others were excluded 493 after the outlier removal procedure. Experiment 4B: The data of 16 participants (9 male, 7 494 female) are reported. Four other participants were discarded based on discard criterion 1; one 495 was discarded based on criterion 2; and four others were excluded after the outlier removal 496 procedure. 497
Data Availability
498
All data that support these findings are publicly available at 499 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3325023 500 501
Code Availability
502
The code necessary to reproduce these findings and analyses is available at 503 https://github.com/dianaperez25/BlurPerception 504 505 Bipartite displays were used in an online experiment to assess familiarity/novelty of stimuli. In this case, the black 711 region delineates the silhouette of a standing woman.
